BYU Law Review
Volume 1980 | Issue 3

Article 7

9-1-1980

Application of the "Exculpatory No" Defense to
Prosecutions Under 18 U.S.C. $ 1001: United
States v. Fitzgibbon
James M. Dester

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
James M. Dester, Application of the "Exculpatory No" Defense to Prosecutions Under 18 U.S.C. $ 1001: United States v. Fitzgibbon, 1980
BYU L. Rev. 655 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1980/iss3/7

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

CASENOTES
Application of the "Exculpatory No" Defense to
Prosecutions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001: United
States u. Fitzgibbon
During the past thirty years, the federal judiciary has confronted a number of novel and troublesome applications of the
federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. 8 1001.' To limit the
scope of the statute, the Fifth Circuit originated the "exculpatory no" defense in 1962? The question has now arisen whether
the defense should apply to protect those who give false statements to United States Customs officials. In United States v.
S~hnaiderman,~
the Fifth Circuit held that the defense does apply in such situation^.^ However, the Tenth Circuit recently held
1. 18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (1976) originated in legislation enacted over 100 years ago. Act
of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. A number of amendments have broadened the
original provision against false statements. For a summary of these amendments, see
United States v. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. 857 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S.
503 (1954). In 1948 the statute was amended to its present form as 18 U.S.C. $ 1001. Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683. The statute provides as follows:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing
or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Recent cases arising under this statute include those concerning persons who file false
statements on tax returns, see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Note,
Constitutionally Privileged False Statements, 22 STAN.L. REV. 783 (1970), and informants who give false information to the F.B.I., see United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d
943 (5th Cir. 1974).
2. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962). The defendant in
Paternostro was questioned by Internal Revenue agents about a "graft money" scheme
in the New Orleans Police Department. The defendant answered negatively when asked
whether he knew about or had participated in the scheme. These answers were later
found to be false. The court stated that "mere negative responses to questions propounded . . . by an investigating agent during a question and answer conference, not
initiated by the [defendant]" are not statements as required by 18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (1976).
Id. a t 305. This is commonly referred to as the "exculpatory no" defense.
3. 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978).
4. Schnaiderman was a Venezuelan who entered the United States a t Miami, Flor-
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to the contrary in United States v. Fitzgibbon?
On March 31, 1977, Kenneth C. Fitzgibbon landed in the
United States at Denver, Colorado, on an airline flight from Canada. Upon his arrival, Fitzgibbon returned customs form 6059B to an airport customs ~fficial.~
The form requests the passenger to indicate whether he is carrying more than $5,000 in coin,
currency, or monetary instruments. Fitzgibbon checked a "no"
response to this question. Persons carrying more than $5,000 are
required to report additional information about the money on a
separate form.' During a subsequent routine inspection, a customs official repeated the question orally and Fitzgibbon again
answered "no." At this point the official noticed that Fitzgibbon
was nervous and conducted a search in which more than $10,000
was found in Fitzgibbon's boots.
Fitzgibbon was later convicted of knowingly and willfully
making a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 1001. The
conviction was based solely on the false written answer that
Fitzgibbon had given on the customs form. On appeal: Fitzgibida, on a flight from Caracas. When asked if he was carrying more than $5,000, he answered "no." He also responded "no" to the same question on customs form 6059-B.
When Schnaiderman was searched, however, more than $8,000 was found in his pockets.
The Fifth Circuit applied the "exculpatory no" doctrine to reverse Schnaiderman's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
5. 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980).
6. Form 6059-B is given to all passengers entering the United States. It is one of
several forms used by the United States Customs Service pursuant to the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. $8 1051-143 (1976), and regulations
promulgated thereunder, 31 C.F.R. $8 103.11-.51 (1979).
7. Form 4790 of the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department, entitled
"Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments," is used
to report sums greater than $5,000. This report is required by 31 U.S.C. 8 1101 (1976),
which reads in pertinent part:
[Wlhoever . . . knowingly(1) transports or causes to be transported monetary instruments(A) from any place within the United States to or through any
place outside the United States, or
(B) to any place within the United States from or through any
place outside the United States . . .
in an amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion shall file a report . . . .
For a discussion of the contents of form 4790, see United States v. San Juan, 405 F.
Supp. 686, 692 (D. Vt. 1975)' reu'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976).
8. This was actually the second time the Tenth Circuit had heard an appeal of Fitzgibbon's case. The first appeal, United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978), resulted in affirmance of the defendant's conviction.
After being incarcerated, Fitzgibbon filed a motion pursuant to the federal habeas corpus
statute, 28 U.S.C. $ 2255 (1976)' to vacate and set aside his sentence. The district court
denied the motion and this second appeal followed. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619
F.2d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1980).
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bon claimed that he had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel at trial because his attorney had failed to raise the "exculpatory no" defense.. The Tenth Circuit thus faced for the
first time the question of whether the "exculpatory no" defense
should prevent a conviction under section 1001 for giving false
negative answers to United States Customs officials. In a unanimous decision the court affirmed the conviction and held that
the defense does not apply.1°
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of the customs situation with an extensive review of the reasoning in Schnaiderman.
The court delineated the five elements of a section 1001 offense
and concluded that these elements had been established at Fitzgibbon's trial." Particular emphasis was placed on the element
of "knowledge and willfulness." The court explained that the
"exculpatory no" defense was based on the assumption that a
negative response, by itself, is not sufficient to establish that a
defendant acted willfully.la In this particular case, however,
Fitzgibbon had been notified of the currency reporting requirements by large signs in the Denver airport.lS The court determined that this additional evidence, when combined with the
negative response, was sutticient to prove that Fitzgibbon had
acted with the required intent.14
After determining that the statutory elements had been
met, the court gave two other reasons why the "exculpatory no"
defense should not apply. First, the defense was established to
prevent convictions for giving false answers to "investigative
agents" of the government? According to the Tenth Circuit, the
function of the customs officials was not investigative, but ad9. The Tenth Circuit observed that the defendant's counsel had, in fact, raised the
"exculpatory no" defense before the trial court on a motion to dismiss and in the first
appeal. The court elected to reach the issue, however, "both because it was apparently
not properly articulated in the prior proceedings and because it [was] an issue which
[had] not been previously decided by this Court." 619 F.2d at 876.
10. 619 F.2d at 880. This result was in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978).
11. The offense requires (1) a statement, (2) that the statement be false, (3) that the
statement be material, (4) that the statement be made in a "matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States," and (5) that the statement be
made knowingly and willfully. 619 F.2d at 879.
12. Id. at 876-77.
13. Id. at 880.
14. Id.
15. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 305, 309 (5th Cir. 1962).
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ministrative.16 Second, the court saw no possibility of self-incrimination-a premise of the "exculpatory no" defense-in this
customs situation.''
Although the Tenth Circuit in Fitzgibbon appears to have
arrived at a better result than the Fifth Circuit in
Schnaiderman, the reasoning of both courts was based, at times,
on unsound interpretations of 18 U.S.C. 5 1001.18 In Fitzgibbon,
the court stated that "[tlhe predicate of the 'exculpatory no' defense is simply that a negative response cannot serve as proof of
the requisite knowledge and willfulness required to convict
under 18 U.S.C. 5 1001."19 The court thus perceived the defense
as centering on a narrow interpretation of the requirement of
willfulness. This perception, however, is not entirely accurate.
The Fifth Circuit and a number of lower courts created the
"exculpatory no" defense to limit the applicability of the false
statements statute.'O To accomplish this end, these courts restricted the scope of the term "statement" as used in section
1001, rather than the terms "knowing and willful."21 The courts
16. 619 F.2d at 880-81.
17. Id. at 881. In order for the "exculpatory no" defense to apply, the government
inquiry must have created a potential for self-incrimination. See United States v. Bush,
503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 207 (D. Md. 1955). In Fitzgibbon, the
Tenth Circuit said that there was no potential for self-incrimination because "Fitzgibbon
could not have been held criminally liable under the subject statute had he truthfully
reported the . . . currency." 619 F.2d a t 881. The Fifth Circuit in Schnaiderrnan, however, felt that there was a possibility of self-incrimination in this type of situation. 568
F.2d a t 1213-14. Only one federal court has had occasion to decide this fifth amendment
issue directly. United States v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686 (D. Vt. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976). In San Juan, the court held that the customs
forms do not violate the fifth amendment. Id. at 694-95.
18. The only factual difference between the two cases is that Fitzgibbon was charged
for having given a false written statement, whereas Schnaiderman was charged for having given a false oral statement. The distinction between oral and written statements,
however, has been held to be insignificant. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S.
43, 46 (1952).
19. 619 F.2d at 876.
20. See United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying a limited view of the term "statement"); United States v. Moore, 185 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir.
1950) (calling for strict construction of 1 1001); United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (holding negative responses incapable of perverting a governmental
function); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955) (applying a limited
view of the term "statement"); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953)
(calling for strict construction of 1 1001 to preserve the validity of perjury statutes).
21. See United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D.
Md. 1955).
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interpreted the term "statement" to require an affirmative and
voluntary expression or action on the part of the defendant-an
expression or action capable of perverting some governmental
function." Under this view, mere passive, false responses to governmental inquiries do not constitute "statements" within the
meaning of section 1001.as The "exculpatory no" defense was
thus predicated on a narrow view of the type of statement that
section 1001 proscribes, not on the degree of intent with which
the statement was uttered.
Nevertheless, the degree of intent required by the statute
was a controlling issue in Fitzgibbon. Both the Fifth Circuit and
the Tenth Circuit approaches to finding willfulness require a
showing that the defendant acted with bad intent. In both circuits, the government is expected to provide travelers with a certain amount of notice concerning the currency reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. § llO1.U Unless a defendant has received
this notice, the courts will find him incapable of forming the intent to pervert the functions of the Customs Servi~e.'~In
Schnaiderman, the court held that the defendant had not reThe
ceived sufficient notice to have this level of willf~lness.~~
Tenth Circuit, however, indicated that large signs in the Denver
airport gave Fitzgibbon s d c i e n t notice of the reporting laws to
enable his conduct to be willful.37
It is arguable that both courts defined willfulness too narrowly. The legislative history of section 1001 does not give any
indication of what Congress intended the word "willful" to
mean.'= The federal courts, however, agreed on a definition of
22. Compare United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) with Paternostro v.
United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) and United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190,
205 (D. Md. 1955).
23. United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206 (D. Md. 1955).
24. In the Fifth Circuit, the government must show that the defendant not only
knew about the reporting requirements, but that he also knew it was not a crime to
transport more than $5,000 as long as it had been reported. United States v.
Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978). The Tenth Circuit apparently requires only that the government notify travelers of the reporting requirements. This can
be inferred from the court's great effort to show that Fitzgibbon had been so notified.
619 F.2d at 880.
25. This theory was first set forth in United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp.
519 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), reu'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977). See also
United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d a t 1213.
26. 568 F.2d at 1213.
27. 619 F.2d at 880.
28. Fir a detailed discussion of the legislative history of 5 1001, see United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941); United States v. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. 857 (D.D.C.),
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the term some twenty-five years ago. In 1951, the Tenth Circuit
held it unnecessary for "the Government to prove . . . an evil
intent" in cases under section 1001.29The only intent required
was an intent to utter the false statement. "Willful," the court
stated, "means no more than that the interdicted act is done
deliberately and with kno~ledge."~~
The Fifth Circuit in 1955
defined "willful" in the same termsm and did not change its 'definition until S ~ h n a i d e r m a n In
. ~ ~1969, the Supreme Court lent
its approval to these early definitions used by the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits." The Court spoke of willfulness in terms of
"know[ing] the falsity of [one's] statement at the time it was
made," and of not being the "product of an accident, honest inadvertence, or d ~ r e s s . " ~
The requirement of bad intent, which was adopted in both
Schnaiderman and Fitzgibbon, appears to be the result of an
erroneous interpretation of United States u. Gilliland.s6 In Gilliland, the Supreme Court held that a 1934 amendment to section 100IMwas intended "to protect the authorized functions of
governmental departments and agencies from the perversion
which might result from the deceptive practices described [in
the statute]."" From this statement the Fifth Circuit erroneously concluded that section 1001 requires an "intent to pervert
the purpose of' the customs regulations." The Tenth Circuit required a similar finding of intent.s9 The Supreme Court's statement in GiNiland, however, does not require a finding of intent
-

--

-

-

rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 503 (1954).
29. Walker v. United States, 192 F.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir. 1951).
30. Id.
31. McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 253-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
934 (1955).
32. See generally United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Parten, 462 F.2d 430, 432-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983
(1972). Both of these Fifth Circuit cases retained the original definition of "willfulness"
as merely being "deliberate."
33. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1969).
34. Id.
35. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
36. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996. The amendment eliminated a requirement that a defendant's false statement must have resulted in pecuniary or property loss to the government. For a detailed discussion of this amendment, see United
States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
37. 312 U.S. at 93.
38. See United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. The court emphasized that Fitzgibbon's false statement was "designed to conceal information relevant to the administrative process." 619 F.2d at 880. In other words,
Fitzgibbon intended to pervert the function of the customs agent.
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to pervert the functions of government. It merely states that
perversion of governmental functions is the likely result of false
statements and that the amendment was intended to prevent
such perversion by punishing those who utter false statements.
Thus, the proper interpretation of the term "willful" as
used in section 1001 is not nearly as restrictive as the courts in
Fitzgibbon and Schnaiderman believed. There is no requirement of bad intent-an intent to pervert a governmental function. All that is required is that the defendant intend to make
the statement and that the defendant know that his statement is
false when he makes it. Under this standard, both Fitzgibbon
and Schnaiderman clearly acted knowingly and willfully within
the meaning of section 1001.
Another reason for the Tenth Circuit's refusal to apply the
"exculpatory no" defense was its belief that the customs agents
were not performing an "investigative" function.'O United
States v. Paterno~tro,'~
which established the defense, restricted
its use to cases in which an "investigating agent'' propounded
questions to the defendant." Under the Paternostro test, this
issue is determined by whether the government official is "performing essentially the [investigative] functions of a 'policeman., "49 This would include investigating possible criminal activity. But there is no clear answer as to how customs agents
should be classified under the Paternostro test."
Debate over the correct classification, however, is unnecessary. The distinction between investigative and administrative
agents arose from a narrow interpretation of the term "jurisdic40.
41.
42.
43.

619 F.2d at 880-81.
311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 305, 309.
Id. at 309.
44. Certain factora support and others refute the classification of customs officials as
"investigative agents." The express purpose of the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. 85 1051-143 (1976), is "to require certain reports . . . where
such reporta . . . have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." Id. 1051. One federal district court has said that the Act is
more criminal than regulatory. United Statea v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686,693 (D. Vt.
1975), reu'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976). Furthermore, the Act provides criminal as well as civil sanctions for its violation. 31 U.S.C. § 1058 (1976).
It has also been argued, however, that the distribution of form 6059-B is strictly
administrative in nature. 619 F.2d a t 880-81. The form is not required by the Act but is
merely an administrative tool used to help customs officials determine which travelers
need to file a report. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. "There [is] no indication
of criminal investigation or police coercion" surrounding completion of the form by a
traveler. 619 F.2d at 880.
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tion" as used in 18 U.S.C. 8 1001. In United States u. Dauey," a
federal district court held that the investigative function of the
F.B.I. was not a "matter within the jurisdiction of a department
or agency of the United States." After Dauey, other courts began
to distinguish between investigative and administrative functions. Paternostro made the distinction a part of the "exculpatory no" defense in 1962:. and the Eighth Circuit followed suit
in 1967." In 1969, however, the Supreme Court dealt what
should have been a deathblow to tbis distinction. In Bryson v.
United state^,'^ the Court stated:
Because there is a valid legislative interest in protecting the
we think the term "jurisdicintegrity of official inquiries,
tion" should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for
A statutory basis for an agency's repurposes of 5 1001
quest for information provides jurisdiction enough to punish
fraudulent statements under $ lOOl.'@

...

....

The Court cited with approval a case from the Second Circuit
that severely criticized the classification of governmental functions as being either administrative or investigati~e.~~
Accordingly, the debate over whether customs officials
should be classified as investigative or administrative agents is
futile. The distinction, based on a narrow reading of "jurisdiction" under section 1001, has been expressly condemned." The
information that customs officials request concerning currency
has the statutory basis required by Bryson, and that statutory
basis has been held constitutional." Whether the agent's function is administrative or investigative is irrelevant. The critical
question is whether a defendant's false statements are capable of
perverting a government agent's function.
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit agree that a
customs agent's function with respect to the currency reporting
45. 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
46. 311 F.2d at 305, 309.
47. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
48. 396 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1969).
49. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
50. See United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917,921-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1006 (1967), cited with approval in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. at 70-71 (1969).
51. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1969).
52. In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Supreme Court
upheld the statutory basis underlying the currency reporting requirements. See also
United States v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686 (D. Vt. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 545
F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976).
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requirement is to ensure that the transportation of more than
$5,000 into the United States is reported? A negative answer on
form 6059-B is capable of obstructing the agent's function. The
question on form 6059-B is the agent's primary tool to prevent
currency in excess of $5,000 from going unreported. Unless there
is some other overt indication that a traveler is lying, a false
negative response will result in frustration of the agent's
function.
Although the Fifth and Tenth Circuits arrived at opposite
conclusions in Schnaiderman and Fitzgibbon, their reasoning
was based on the same erroneous premises. Both courts applied
too strict a definition of willfulness, and both courts relied on a
classification of governmental functions that has been invalidated by the Supreme Court. In each case, these issues should
have been resolved against the defendants. Thus, although based
on unsound reasoning, the Tenth Circuit's conviction of Fitzgibbon was a correct result.

James M.Dester

53. See United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980).

